Everyday Ethics

Our previous article examined ethical questions regarding the current injury situation of San Diego Chargers linebacker Shawne Merriman.  Specifically, we asked whether an evaluation of potential consequences could tell us whether the Chargers should allow Merriman to play, and if there are any ethical concerns with doing so.  We found that there are some significant shortcomings related to trying to answer the ethical question in this way, leading us to seek an alternative way of looking at this issue.  We turn now to that alternative, that of a deontological assessment.

To again explain the ethical perspective being utilized, deontology is commonly known as “duty” ethics.  The philosopher Immanuel Kant originally formulated this concept, which seeks to establish exactly what duties or obligations people have to other people, by virtue of their status as rational beings.  Two issues in the Merriman case seem pertinent here.  The first concerns Merriman’s autonomy, while the second considers the nature of contractual obligations.  We turn to an examination of each issue, with the goal of clarifying what, if anything, the Chargers are obligated to do about Merriman’s injury.

Autonomy refers to a person’s individual freedom, their right to make meaningful choices about the trajectory of their lives.  It is a commonly held belief among both Kantian philosophers and normal citizens that a person has a right to make autonomous free choices, and that this right is guaranteed by their status as rational beings.  At first glance, it appears that the Chargers would be infringing upon Merriman’s right to make free autonomous choices if they were to prevent him from playing football this season.  Merriman’s right to autonomy thus entails a right to play if he chooses to do so, regardless of how stupid that decision may be.

Another significant matter worth considering is the question of contractual obligations.  After all, Merriman and the Chargers do have a legal contract whereby he agrees to play football in exchange for financial compensation.  The Chargers are obligated to pay Merriman even if he is unable to play due to injury, provided his injury is sustained during practice, training or actual play.  Merriman is obligated to train, practice, and play as long as he is physically able to do so.  So again, it seems that at first glance Merriman is obligated to play by virtue of the fact that he claims to be able to do so, and the Chargers have no obligation to prevent this, at least not in virtue of their contractual agreement.

We need to say a bit more, however, about the nature of a contract.  After all, though it is not necessarily stated in the contract, the Chargers do have some duties to protect the well-being of their players.  They must provide acceptable equipment, both in terms of pads and helmets, and weight equipment.  They also must provide accurate medical and nutritional guidance, as this is a substantial part of a professional athlete’s success.  Thus, there is some sense in which a contractual agreement does include a stipulation that the team must protect the well-being of the player. 

Much like our analysis of the consequences of Merriman’s decision to play, it seems that a consideration of relevant duties and obligations has not yielded a clear answer.  We do, however, need to account for the question of personal autonomy, for it does seem that the Chargers are committing an ethical infraction by denying Merriman’s right to make a free decision about whether he wants to play football.  In our final section on this topic, we will offer a reply to the autonomy question that seems to diffuse its relevance as a supporting argument for Merriman’s right to play.  We will conclude by extrapolating some general conclusions about moral decision-making that will hopefully make some degree of difference in our own ability to make good moral choices. 

About the Author

Elijah Weber is a graduate student at Bowling Green State University. He holds a Master's degree in philosophy from Colorado State University, and Bachelor’s degrees in sociology and philosophy from Chapman Univerity. He currently lives in Bowling Green, Ohio with his wife Laura, his newborn son Brandon, and his feline life-partner Monte.