Everyday Ethics

Here, as promised, is the third and final installment in our analysis of the ethical obligations of the San Diego Chargers to their injured star, Shawne Merriman.  Thus far, we have discovered that looking at consequences did little in helping us to resolve this question, while considerations regarding contractual obligation were helpful, but still unclear.  However, it seems that we did discover a potential solution in considering Merriman’s autonomy, his right to make his own meaningful life choices.  Here in our final installment, we will consider the notion of autonomy a bit further, and conclude by drawing some general conclusions from this scenario.

As we articulated in installment two, it seems that if Merriman has a right to autonomy, the Chargers do not merely lack an obligation to prevent Merriman from playing, but rather have a duty to allow Merriman to play.  This analysis assumes, falsely I think, that Merriman’s decision to play is really a free choice.  Autonomy is a sticky concept, in that it requires that we allow agents to make free choices, but without stipulating what actually counts as a free choice.

When we consider the question of whether Merriman’s decision to play is really a free one, we should begin by examining the cultural atmosphere of professional sports.  Athletes are taught that winning championships is the ultimate good.  They are also instilled with the belief that if you are physically able to play, you ought to do so, regardless of potential risks to your long-term health.  Finally, they are somewhat treated as “superhuman”, built up as demigods of society who are not subject to the natural laws of normal humans, including susceptibility to injuries.

Thus, if the above case is accurate, it is questionable whether Merriman’s decision to play football despite his injury is really a free one.  He has been indoctrinated with an ideology that encourages and supports this choice for many years.  At best, it is suspect to claim that Merriman’s decision to play football with three torn knee ligaments is really a free one.

Where does this leave us?  It is doubtful that we will adequately resolve the issue of the Chargers’ ethical obligation to Shawne Merriman in the space provided.  However, that was never really our intent.  The purpose of everyday ethics is not necessarily to resolve ethical dilemmas, but to acquire knowledge through their contemplation.  Thus, we turn to some reasonable conclusions based on our analysis.

First, it seems that evaluating consequences, although important, cannot be taken as the whole story.  It is a helpful strategy, but not the only consideration that matters ethically.  In addition, the notion of contracts is potentially problematic in ethics because we must consider not only what is stated in the contract, but also what can reasonably be inferred from its stipulations.

Finally, we can conclude that the notion of personal autonomy, which is highly influential in our society, cannot be considered independently of the cultural environment within which one makes choices.  Often we are influenced by factors that we are not fully aware of, and free choices must truly be free if they are to be morally relevant.  To consider all choices as necessarily free is an error in reasoning.

I hope that this series has been a pleasant journey for the reader.  It is a paradigm example of everyday ethics in action.  While it is beneficial to attempt to resolve ethical questions in everyday life, that is not really our purpose.  When we turn away from resolving these issues and focus on what can be learned from them, we are in a better position to learn the ethical lesson that the world is trying to teach. 

About the Author

Elijah Weber is a graduate student at Bowling Green State University. He holds a Master's degree in philosophy from Colorado State University, and Bachelor’s degrees in sociology and philosophy from Chapman Univerity. He currently lives in Bowling Green, Ohio with his wife Laura, his newborn son Brandon, and his feline life-partner Monte.